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By Mercedes Cardona 
 
Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as 
the commission’s director of investigations. The ten-member bipartisan commission was 
charged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 
(GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from 
September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a 662-page report that attempted to explain 
why the crisis came about and what roles government and private enterprise played in the 
crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer. 
A crisis is widespread, and in looking for the root causes there will be many opinions 
and viewpoints; it is critical to gather a multitude of viewpoints.  
The commission’s charge was broad, and Seefer said that in order to get to the root of the 
causes of the crisis, the commission set out to interview a wide range of companies and 
individuals. They knew from the beginning that they wanted to interview all types of market 
participants in order to build a full picture of what had happened and why. He described the 
commission’s scope of inquiry this way: 
Essentially, you’re going to look at the banks or the insurance companies that failed 
or received government assistance to figure out what happened with them, to the best 
of your ability. An important part of that requires that you are not only talking to the 
company’s executives and looking at their internal documents, but also going to the 
folks whose work is adjacent to theirs. Whether it was the rating agencies giving AAA 
ratings to the subprime securities firms were issuing, the auditors certifying financial 
statements with questionable accounting practices, or the regulators who were, 
supposedly, on a periodic basis making sure everything was “safe and sound.” And so, 
that’s the scope of who we investigated.  
Then, of course, you had outside investors, market participants and just people that 
were on the other side. We interviewed the folks that thought they recognized the 
problems early on and took the short side of the security investments, the Michael 
Berrys of the world, the John Paulsons of the world. 
We cast a wide net to talk to as many people as possible about, one, the specific 
companies that we were looking at, and two, more generally what they saw as the 
causes of the crisis. And I actually think that’s one of the things that’s a nice legacy of 
the FCIC on [its] website. Most, if not all, of those interviews were recorded and are 
on that site. And you’ve got a lot of opinions from folks that went through it about 




To get to the bottom of things, you will need subpoena power.  
Because of the high profile of the commission, Seefer said most parties cooperated with its 
requests for documents and interviews. But after losses as widespread and severe as those 
in the GFC, litigation often follows, which complicates efforts to get to the root cause. Many 
of those involved resisted speaking with the commission or would limit the areas that they 
would speak about on advice of counsel. 
In such circumstances, often the threat of a subpoena was enough to compel reluctant 
parties, said Seefer:  
I don’t think we had to use the subpoena a lot, because the threat of the subpoena was 
good enough. I mean, you essentially tell people, “Look, we want you to talk to us and 
you can say yes or no, but if you say no, then we’re going to subpoena you.” And the 
same thing on documents: “We’re going to send you a letter asking for documents 
related to these areas. If you say no, we’re going to subpoena you.”  
However, Seefer recalls, even some parties who wanted to cooperate “needed to be 
subpoenaed” for coverage with their shareholders and any possible legal action: 
My recollection is that very rarely did we have to issue subpoenas. I think we had to 
issue one or two to Goldman Sachs because they were dragging their feet on providing 
documents. At least, in my opinion, they were dragging their feet—I think trying to 
run out the clock. Some people didn’t want to talk for us and asked for a subpoena. 
Warren Buffett wanted a subpoena before he would talk to us. And so, we gave him 
one. It was kind of interesting, really, because he was very cordial and nice when we 
did go out there and talk to him, but I think he just wanted it to show that he was 
compelled to talk to us. 
In the case of Goldman Sachs, Seefer said commission chairman Phil Angelides used a radio 
interview to pressure Goldman Sachs to stop dragging its feet and produce documents the 
commission requested. Sometimes, Seefer continued, the threat of bad publicity, of being 
seen as avoiding the investigators, was enough to convince a party to provide documents 
and agree to an interview.  
Don’t let panic send the market into a tailspin. Transparency helps.  
When asked to identify an element of the commission’s report that he thought was 
particularly valuable, Seefer pointed to its findings about corporate transparency. He noted 
that during the GFC, the lack of transparency had severe effects since the entire economy 
was experiencing the results of the housing market collapse. “It was very difficult to tell just 
from public reports the level of derivatives that a company had and what their counterparty 
exposure was,” said Seefer. The lack of transparency made matters worse in the early months 
of the crisis, September and October 2008, said Seefer: 
Lehman went down, and nobody knew for sure what impact they were going 
to have on other financial institutions. That lack of transparency contributed 
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to more and more panic and more and more declining asset values and stock 
values and bond values. It was like a vicious circle, just spiraling lower and 
lower and lower in terms of asset values. 
Seefer urged, “Again, lesson learned or policies to follow is: Make sure these companies 
provide more transparency on the assets and liabilities that are on their balance sheets and 
their exposure to other counterparties that they’re doing business with.” 
Better regulation, and coordination between agencies is a must to avoid a new crisis.  
Another area of the commission’s report that Seefer pointed to as valuable was the 
fragmented scope of financial regulation. “It’s not necessarily the case that there are too 
many regulators in different agencies, but that there was not much appetite for enforcing 
oversight,” said Seefer. “I don't know that you need that multiple-headed monster,” said 
Seefer, referring to how some countries have fewer regulators with broader authorities. He 
continued: 
The bigger issue is that the staff in those regulatory agencies largely saw the looming 
problems and didn’t act, for whatever reason—whether it was conflicts, political 
pressure, or just the lack of appetite to take on a multi-trillion-dollar company with 
high-priced lawyers that were going to fight.  
However politically difficult it may be to achieve, regulators have to take a stronger position, 
Seefer insisted:  
Gatekeepers need to do their job and auditors need to take a closer look at financials 
and make sure they’re legit. Rating agencies need to do a better in rating securities. 
Regulators need to do a better job in regulating the institutions they’re charged to 
regulate. [Those], to me, are the lessons learned; but that’s been known, I would like 
to say, at least since the Great Depression.  
Seefer said some of the actions that regulators could take to address issues uncovered by the 
commission are common-sense measures such as higher capital requirements, higher 
liquidity requirements, better ratings of securitizations, and more transparency regarding 
derivatives. Also, said Seefer, “[c]ompanies need to put together a plan on how to have an 
orderly bankruptcy, if nothing else, if you get in trouble and you’re not going to be able to 
survive it, or at least [prepare to] survive it without substantial government assistance.” He 
noted that the Dodd-Frank Act does require certain large companies to create this type of 
“living will.”  
It all could happen again. Individual consequences were not severe enough. 
Seefer pointed out that many of the failings the commission uncovered have not been 
addressed in the decade since the crisis and that few individuals were prosecuted. Seefer 
believes that this lack of prosecution created little disincentive to moderate the behaviors 
that led to the crisis. He reflected further: 
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You hope that the executives of the financial institutions learned, that the regulators 
learned, that the other gatekeepers learned, and that they’re running a safer and 
sounder business that can react to unexpected economic events or financial events. 
But I can’t say I have a lot of confidence in that, because there’s always the financial 
incentive to push it. 
I mean, people make money by generating profits for their company, even if the 
profits that are reflected on the financial statement may not really be there, because 
of either accounting shenanigans or other things. And not a lot of people, if anyone, 
were really, personally, held accountable for any of this. 
_____________________________________ 
Dated: January 2021 
YPFS Lessons Learned No: 2019-20  
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